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Abstract
Budget cuts and high demand in strengthening the security of computer
systems and services today are problematically balanced facts. Poor sys-
tem knowledge and inappropriate selection of security measures may lead
to unexpected financial and data losses. This paper proposes a novel risk
assessment and optimisation model (RAOM) which can be used as an exten-
sion of a standard risk assessment procedure to represent a multi-objective
security countermeasure selection problem, the purpose of which is to min-
imises the risk presented by network vulnerabilities in relation to financial
investments. A multi-objective Tabu Search (MOTS) algorithm has been
developed to construct an efficient frontier of non-dominated solutions and
has been compared to an Exhaustive Search (ES). It is discovered that the
proposed approach provides near optimal results for this type of the prob-
lem and can provide a model used to support financial investment decision
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1. Introduction
In the IT sector, most organisations implement security standards to be
competitive and trustworthy parties that run highly integrated and secure
businesses [1]. However, despite regulations, law and awareness of security
measures, data breaches continue to grow and evolve. For instance, accord-
ing to recent surveys, by around 84% of UK organisations suffered at least
one data breach in 2007 [2].
When an organisation performs regular risk assessments of assets and
services, the risk of experiencing a data breach may decrease. However,
frequently, decisions on what security measures should be implemented are
made based on the personal experience of the decision maker, who is often
unaware of specific system weaknesses and new threats. In order to solve this
issue, researchers have proposed a number of models relating to qualitative
and quantitative risk assessment approaches, where attack trees and attack
graphs are used to estimate the shortest attack paths and related security
costs [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. However, these models lack of practical sense and cannot
support cost-effective security decisions.
A cost-effective and coherent risk assessment should study the relation-
ships among system vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures. Knowing
potential risks gives the ability to organisations to make effective decisions
on what security countermeasures should be implemented before any poten-
tial threat can successfully exploit system vulnerabilities. NIST SP800-30,
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ISO 27001 and ISO 17799 are common methodologies, which provide some
guidelines on how risk should be assessed and how countermeasures should
be selected [8, 9, 10]. However, these guidelines do not provide a specific
method for assessing risk related factors, i.e., vulnerabilities, threats, and
addressing them via security countermeasures.
Security countermeasure selection problems have received a great deal
of attention in the recent literature [11, 12, 13, 1]. However, existing ap-
proaches deal with this problem from very different perspectives. The au-
thors in [12] analyse the countermeasure selection in relation to residual
vulnerabilities, which are represented as uncovered existing vulnerabilities.
The idea behind their approach is to maximise the coverage of existing vul-
nerabilities by implementing the selected set of countermeasures, thus, to
minimise the residual vulnerability (uncovered). Another approach to select
a portfolio of countermeasures in relation to investment costs is by analysing
the residual damage in the system if a system hole is not fixed [13] and con-
sidering a set of controls in a form of disabling, enabling or patching a service
or application.
Although they are very detailed in some aspects, current countermea-
sure selection approaches miss some other details. For example, applying a
countermeasure may eliminate some risks, but generate new ones under cer-
tain circumstances. Therefore, it is not enough performing risk assessments
and independently selecting security countermeasures, but it is necessary to
understand the bi-directional relationship between them both. In this way,
we can make sure in a cost-effective manner that organisations are aware of
possible data losses and that the adequate security countermeasures are in
place.
Due to the lack of studies on this topic, this paper investigates risk
3
assessment methodologies and provides a tool to select security counter-
measures taking financial costs and residual risks into account. More specif-
ically, based on NIST SP800-30 guidelines, we propose a risk assessment
and optimisation model (RAOM) to satisfy organisational security needs in
a cost-effective manner, systematically present our security countermeasure
selection problem and formulate it as a multi-objective optimisation prob-
lem, where variables such as financial cost and residual risks may affect the
final solution. We also propose a tailored Tabu Search(TS)-based heuristic
approach to solve the proposed multi-objective optimisation problem and
asses the qualities of its solutions with respect to optimal ones.
2. Risk Assessment and Optimisation Model (RAOM)
In this section we present our risk assessment model, compare it to NIST
SP800-30 framework and formally define our multi-objective optimisation
problem.
ROAM consists of two processes, risk assessment and optimisation rou-
tine. The purpose of the proposed RAOM is to provide the foundation of
an effective risk assessment procedure, containing practical methods neces-
sary for assessing risks and cost-effectively minimising them through security
countermeasures. Figure 1 illustrates the flow chart of RAOM, which de-
scribes firstly the risk assessment stages (Part A), including identification of
risks through a vulnerability assessment, their impacts through the analysis
of threats mapped onto vulnerabilities and secondly, optimisation routine
(Part B), which is used to find optimal solutions in a cost-effective manner.
The first stage in our proposed risk assessment procedure is to identify
essential organisation’s systems and functions, which cannot be interrupted
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Figure 1: Risk assessment and optimisation model (RAOM) flow chart
under any circumstances. Then, these systems and functions are assessed
for vulnerabilities, because if there is a vulnerability in the network, there is
the risk that a threat exploits the vulnerability, and hence the organisation
may face unexpected technical damages and financial expenditures. Vul-
nerabilities, technical or nontechnical, can be identified in four ways: using
automated vulnerability scanning tools, performing penetration tests on sys-
tems, using vulnerability modelling techniques and assessing previous risk
assessment IT documentation. Once the vulnerabilities are characterised, it
is important to identify the threats that can exploit them. Vulnerabilities
can only be translated into risk if there is a threat able to exploit them. If
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we can estimate vulnerabilities and threats, we can derive the level of risk
in an organisation. Our aim is then to reduce this level of risk by selecting
the appropriate set of countermeasures in a cost-effective manner.
2.1. Definition of Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are the weaknesses or flaws in system security proce-
dures, design or internal controls that can be triggered or intentionally
exploited, resulting in a security breach or a violation of security policy.
The National Vulnerability Database provides a source of technical vulner-
abilities [14]. Every vulnerability may have a different impact level on a
system.Traditionally, the impacts of a vulnerability on confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability (CIA) are considered, where for each one of them,
there are three impact levels: partial (P), complete (C) and none (N). The
tuple comprised of the three potential impact levels on CIA of a vulner-
ability is then translated into an impact sub-score Isub with range [1,10],
where 1 is the lowest and 10 is the highest impact. Isub can also be retrieved
from the National Vulnerability Database [14], and depends on the inherent
characteristics of the vulnerability: exploit range, attack complexity, level
of authentication needed.
Table 1 provides an example of the potential impact on CIA and sub-
score Isub of some vulnerabilities. Furthermore, each vulnerability impact
sub-score Isub is mapped onto impact I ∈ {10, 50, 100} where 10 indicates
a low impact on CIA, 50 - medium, 100 - high. Impact value I has been
introduced to scale variations of Isub.
Let each vulnerability be represented as a single bit in the vulnerability
vector:
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Representation Vulnerability CVE number Impact Impact
(Repr.) on CIA Sub-score
V1 Default, missing or blank local user password 1999-0504 PPP 6
V2 VirusScan NT 4.0.2 doesn not modify scan.dat file 1999-1195 PPP 6
V3 Administrator password disclosure 2006-0561 CCC 10
V4 IE version 5.01.5.5 and 6.0 2003-0344 PPP 6
V5 SSH v1 in OpenSSH has various weaknesses 2001-0572 PPP 6
V6 Cisco CSS11000 malformed UDP packet vulnerability 2004-0352 NNP 2
V7 mysqld in MySQL 3.21 stores passwords in log file 1999-1188 PPP 6
V8 MySQL 3.21 allows mysql users to gain root privileges 2003-0150 CCC 10
V9 Execute arbitrary commands in wu-ftpd 2.6.1 2001-0550 PPP 6
V10 wu-ftpd 2.6.1 with the restricted-gid option enabled 2004-0148 CCC 10
allows local users to bypass access restrictions
Table 1: Vulnerability and corresponding CVE, impact information
~V = {Vi} = {1, 0} ∀i, i = 1, 2, ..., n. (1)
where Vi represents an individual vulnerability. The value 1 indicates the
presence of this vulnerability in the information systems, otherwise 0.
Moreover, as discussed before, impact on CIA sub-score Isub of vulnera-
bility i is mapped onto impact Ii as follows
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Ii =


Low(10) when 0.0 ≤ Isub ≤ 3.9;
Medium(50) when 4.0 ≤ Isub ≤ 6.9;
High(100) when 7.0 ≤ Isub ≤ 10;
Because every vulnerability identified in the network is a potential risk,
we include all vulnerabilities into our analysis. For example, if we assume
that an organisation has identified 10 vulnerabilities, we set n to 10 and
Vi = 1 ∀n.
2.2. Threat Analysis
The next step in the model is to perform a threat analysis, which consists
of identifying potential threat sources and actions that may exploit system
vulnerabilities. An attack can be defined as the action, in which a threat
exploits a vulnerability that may create some risk in the system.
Information about threats can be gathered from the organisation’s his-
torical data base about the attacks recorded in system log files or by using
threat modelling techniques, which can predict threats not known to the
organisation. For example, modelling techniques, such as attack graphs, at-
tack trees or an onion skin model [15, 16] have been used to predict new
threats in particular scenarios.
Let each threat be represented as a single bit in the threat vector:
~T = {Tj} = {0, 1} ∀j, j = 1, 2, ...,m. (2)
where Tj represents an individual threat. The value 1 indicates the presence
of this threat in the information systems and otherwise 0.
Thereafter, based on data breaches reports, logged attack attempts and
self-expertise, we can match threats to vulnerabilities (Table 2) and estimate
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Threat Threats/ Repr. Matched
sources Actions vulnerability
Incompetent user Unauthorized user gets access to resources T1 V1,V3, V7,V8,V9 ,V10
Physical attack T2 V1,V3, V7,V8 ,V10
Hacker Social engineering T3 V3,V8 ,V9
Tamper the protection relevant mechanisms T4 V1,V2, V5,V6 ,V10
Reckless network administration T5 V1,V2,V3,V4,V5,V9 ,V10
Tactical attack Improper management T6 V1,V3, V4,V7,V8
Viruses, Trojans, Worms T7 V2,V4, V6
Architecture, design T8 V5,V6, V9,V10
and implementation flaws
DoS attack T9 V4,V6, V7
Industrial Espionage BoF attack T10 V4,V8, V9,V10
No Audits T11 V1,V3, V4,V6,V8 ,V9,V10
Service administrator Elevation of privileges T12 V1,V3, V5,V7 ,V8
Password compromise through T13 V3,V4, V5
plain text communication
Dictionary/Brute Force attack T14 V1,V3, V5,V7 ,V9
Arbitrary code execution T15 V1,V4, V5,V9
Table 2: Matching threats and vulnerabilities
the likelihood Lij of a threat Tj acting over a vulnerability Vi, as shown in
Table 3, i.e., Lij = 〈Vi, Tj〉 [17, 18, 19].
This likelihood can adopt three values: 0.1, 0.5 and 1, where the value
0.1 represents low likelihood of threat Tj exploiting vulnerability Vi, 0.5 -
medium likelihood and 1 - high likelihood. If a threat Tj has no effect on a
vulnerability Vi, there is no risk and we make Lij = 0.
2.3. Risk Level Analysis
Definition 1: Total Initial Risk (TIR) is the sum of initial risks in an
organisation, when no security countermeasure has been applied, and can
be computed as follows
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V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10
T1 0.1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1
T2 1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1
T3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0
T4 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 0.5
T5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0.1 0.1
T6 1 0 0.5 0.1 0 0 0.5 0.1 0 0
T7 0 1 0 0.5 0 0.1 0 0 0 0
T8 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.1 0 0 0.1 1
T9 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
T10 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.5 0.1 0.5
T11 0.5 0 0.5 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5
T12 1 0 1 0 0.1 0 0.5 1 0 0
T13 0 0 0.5 0.1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
T14 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 0 0.5 0
T15 0.1 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 1 0
Table 3: Likelihood value Lij
TIR =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Lij ∗ Ii, (3)
where TIR ∈ R+;
Once TIR is known, the organisation becomes aware of how critical
identified vulnerabilities are for running a successful business. Thus, the next
step is to identify potential security countermeasures that can be applied to
reduce the TIR value.
2.4. Control Recommendation
In general, security countermeasures (Table 4) can be categorised as
technical, management and operational based on the function they provide.
Similar classification can be found in the NIST report [8].
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Category Type Countermeasure Representation
Support Identification S1
Cryptographic key management S2
Security administration S3
Technical System protection S4
Prevent Authentication S5
Authorisation S6
Access Control Enforcement S7
Non repudiation S8
Protected communication S9
Transaction privacy S10
Audit S11
Detect and Recover Intrusion detection and Containment S12
Virus detection and eradication S13
Assign security responsibilities S14
Implement separation of duties, least privilege S15
Preventive and PC access registration and termination
Management Conduct security awareness and technical training S16
and PC access registration and termination
Detection Conduct periodic review of security controls S17
Periodic system audits S18
Recovery Provide continuity of support and test, maintain it S19
Control data media access and disposal S20
Control software viruses S21
Operational Preventive Safeguard computing facility (e.g.biometric access control) S22
Protect laptops, personal computers, workstations S23
Detection Provide physical security (e.g. motion detectors) S24
Table 4: A generic list of security countermeasures for identified vulnerabilities and threats
Let each countermeasure be represented as a single bit in the counter-
measure vector:
~S = {Sl} = {0, 1} ∀l, l = 1, 2, ..., k. (4)
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where Sl represents an individual countermeasure. The value 1 indicates
that this countermeasure is applied to the information system and otherwise
0.
The selection of countermeasures is performed by first matching them
to identified vulnerabilities as shown in Table 5. In particular, we assign zli
based on the characteristics of a certain vulnerability and a countermeasure,
and realistically assign the matching values for certain combinations based
on its applicability. Previously countermeasure-to-vulnerability matching
idea has been proposed in [20].
Information in Table 5 has been mostly retrieved from NIST vulnerabil-
ity database [14], where general information about vulnerabilities as well as
countermeasures from a number of vendors can be found. Furthermore, we
have relied on data breach reports [14, 21, 22] and our own knowledge to de-
liver the concise data about what vulnerabilities can be created or addressed
while an appropriate countermeasure is implemented.
Each countermeasure-vulnerability combination zli may have one of the
five possible consequences:
zli =


1 if Sl directly addresses Vi;
0.5 if Sl indirectly addresses Vi;
0 if Sl and Vi do not match;
−0.5 if Sl indirectly creates Vi;
−1 if Sl directly creates Vi.
Note that if it is properly selected, a countermeasure can address a vulner-
ability, but if it is not adequately chosen may generate a new one. This fact
penalises organisations that do not judiciously select countermeasures.
Each of these countermeasures has an associated cost Cl. In this study,
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Vulnerability / V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10
Countermeasure
S1 1 0 -0.5 0 0.5 0 -0.5 -0.5 0 -0.5
S2 0 0 -0.5 0 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0 0.5 0.5
S3 1 0.5 -0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
S4 -0.5 0 -1 0 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
S5 0.5 0 -1 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 -0.5 -0.5
S6 0.5 0 -0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0
S7 0 0.5 -0.5 0 0.5 0 0 1 0 0
S8 0 0 -0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
S9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5
S10 0 0 -1 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0 -0.5
S11 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1
S12 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 0.5
S13 0 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0
S14 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0
S15 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5
S16 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1
S17 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1
S18 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
S19 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0 -0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0
S20 -0.5 0 -0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S21 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
S22 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S23 0 -0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0
S24 -0.5 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5: Matching countermeasures to vulnerabilities zli
we have identified four different costs of implementing a security counter-
measure - purchase cost (monetary), operational cost (monetary), training
cost (monetary) and man power (monetary).
Purchase cost includes all the costs associated with purchasing a certain
countermeasure from a vendor. All the additional sub-charges, if there are
some, are also summed up to the total purchase cost value. Operational cost
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can be defined as expenses which are related to the operation of a certain
countermeasure: this can be fixed or variable costs, such as delivery costs,
rent payment or electricity charges. Training cost can be applied for such
cases when an additional training is required for an IT staff to increase
security awareness. Man power is calculated in persons per hour required
to implement a new countermeasure or re-configure the existing one.
Operational Man Purchase Training Total
cost ($) power($) cost ($) cost ($) ($)
S1 75 48 200 150 473
S2 30 24 0 300 354
S3 150 24 0 200 374
S4 105 24 150 0 279
S5 45 24 50 50 169
S6 30 24 0 0 54
S7 45 48 500 0 593
S8 60 24 0 0 84
S9 30 24 0 0 54
S10 15 24 0 50 89
S11 735 0 200 0 935
S12 15 24 0 0 39
S13 210 24 160 0 394
S14 75 48 0 0 123
S15 60 48 0 0 108
S16 15 24 0 50 89
S17 300 72 100 0 472
S18 150 0 300 0 450
S19 0 48 0 0 48
S20 75 144 500 0 719
S21 420 24 80 0 524
S22 0 72 50 0 122
S23 450 96 160 200 906
S24 15 24 450 0 489
Table 6: Estimated cost value in monetary units
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The overall cost for a particular security countermeasure Sl is the sum
of the four presented sub-costs defined in monetary units (Eq.5).
Cl =
4∑
n=1
Cn (5)
The cost values estimated for each of the countermeasures used in our
analysis are shown in Table 6. The values have been estimated relying on
the costs offered by the security technology manufacturers and self expertise.
2.5. Risk Assessment and Optimisation Model (RAOM) as an extension of
NIST SP800-30
Organisations use risk assessment methodologies to determine the ex-
tent of existing threats, vulnerabilities and the risk, associated with the
networked systems. NIST SP800-30 risk management guide is designed for
organisations which are willing to perform the risk assessment process in a
coherent way and thus, help decision makers to quantify the level of risk an
organisation has, based on the impact vulnerabilities introduce, likelihood
values and overall network state.
Despite the advantages introduced by the NIST SP800-30, there are
some limitations to be considered. First of all, it is not designed to help in
security countermeasure selection. Also, the data gathering procedure use
a simplified way to quantify risk,i.e. by applying a scale to all risk related
factors. In overall, the quantitative analysis proposed by the standard can-
not be used when optimisation of financial resources in relation to risk is
desired. However, the qualitative analysis used to identify all risk related
factors can be used as a baseline.
To address the issue covered above, we build on NIST SP800-30, how-
ever modify and extend the standard risk assessment procedure by the ad-
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ditional methods, denoted as ’Control Selection’ and ’Optimisation’ (Figure
2). Differently from NIST SP800-30 and other models, we propose a new
Figure 2: Comparison and extension to the NIST SP800-30
way of quantifying risks in relation to threats and vulnerabilities. From
the literature, researchers agree that security is commonly referred to as
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) [23]. In fact, a vulnerability
will impact CIA, if it is exploited and it will cause disruptions in delivering
services to customers, so CIA plays a crucial role in estimating total risks.
Thus, the proposed approach allows to perform a more realistic vulnera-
bility assessment and thus, to calculate the total risk value an organisation
holds considering the impact on security triangle.
RAOM also includes a control selection method, which incorporates a
multi-objective function and an optimisation technique (Figure 1,Part B).
The multi-objective function is proposed considering two conflicting factors:
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cost and risk to be optimised. As a result, an optimisation routine can pro-
vide with the solutions (trade-offs) that can satisfy organisational security
needs in a cost-effective manner.
3. Problem Formulation
We consider two objectives in this study: the total investment cost TC
and the risk R. For the n = 10 vulnerabilities listed in Table 1 we have
suggested l = 24 generic security countermeasures (Table 4). As a result,
the 224 security countermeasures choices available prove the problem to be
hard to solve manually or relying on self-expertise. Furthermore, the time
to find the solution increases when the size of the problem increases, i.e., if
the number of vulnerabilities n, threats m and countermeasures k increases,
the time to find the optimal solution also increases.
Definition 2: Total investment cost
Given a set of k security measures, each having a cost Cl, 1 ≤ l ≤ k and
having a vector of ~S = (Sl), Sl ∈ {0, 1}∀ l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, the total investment
cost TC is defined as:
TC =
{
k∑
l=1
ClSl : Cl > 0, ∀l (Cl)
}
(6)
Sl =

 1 if a security measure l is selected in the solution;0 otherwise.
Definition 3: Risk
Given a total initial risk TIR, a vector ~S = (Sl), Sl ∈ {0, 1}∀ l, 1 ≤ l ≤ k
and a matching matrix zli , zli = 〈Vi, Sl〉, the risk R is defined as:
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R =

TIR−
k∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Lij ∗ Ii ∗ zli ∗ Sl

 (7)
Problem: Given a vector of vulnerabilities ~V , threats ~T and k security
countermeasures, find the vector ~S, which minimises total investment cost
and risk.
min
sl
[TC, R] (8)
3.1. Multi-objective Optimisation Principles
In most real world scenarios problems can be formulated to satisfy single
or multiple objectives and a decision choice is made based on these objectives
and constraints. However, these objectives and constraints are conflicting
each other in many cases, making it difficult to find an optimal solution. The
conflicting nature of multiple objectives cannot be balanced by just finding
a single optimum solution, because when a solution that optimises one of
the objectives may not have the same effect on the other objectives. Thus,
in case when two or more feasible solutions should be compared, a concept
of Pareto front should be considered [24].
Definition 4: Pareto optimal solution, concept of dominance
Let us consider, a minimisation problem, where x and x′ are two feasible
solutions, X is the set of feasible solutions or decision space, i.e., x, x′ ∈ X,
p is an objective where 1 ≤ p ≤ P , P is the maximum number of objectives,
and fp is the cost function of objective p. Then, solution x strictly dominates
or is preferred to solution x′ if each cost function value fp(x) of x is no
greater than the corresponding cost function value fp(x
′) of x′ and at least
one cost function value is strictly less: that is, fp(x) ≤ fp(x
′) for each p and
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fp(x) < fp(x
′) for some p. The set of all non-dominated elements is referred
to as non-dominated frontier or a Pareto front [25].
The concept of dominance plays a crucial role for our problem, i.e.,
minimisation of the security countermeasure cost and risk. A solution that
reduces risk will most probably increase cost and vice versa. However, the
Pareto front of our problem will provide the optimal trade-offs.
Generating a Pareto set can be computationally expensive, though, a
number of stochastic search methods such as evolutionary algorithms, tabu
search, simulated annealing have been developed. In general, these methods
do not guarantee the optimality of the solution but they often find good
approximate solutions. As evolutionary algorithms posses several charac-
teristics that are desired for the multi-objective problems involving multiple
conflicting objectives, and intractably large and complex search spaces, these
types of search strategies have been successfully used for more than a decade
[25].
3.2. Multi-objective Tabu Search (MOTS) for Risk Optimisation
We develop a Tabu Search (TS) technique for solving (8). TS has been
applied to a wide range of combinatorial optimisation (e.g. scheduling, rout-
ing, traveling salesman) problems. We are now willing to test its the effi-
ciency in the security countermeasure selection problem. The elements, pa-
rameters and operation that have been used in our algorithm are presented
as following:
• Solution ~S.
A solution is a selection of countermeasures.
• Initial random solution ~Srnd.
The multi-objective TS (MOTS) algorithm starts from creating an
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initial solution, which is randomly selected, i.e., each element Sl of
solution ~S is set to 0 or 1 with an equal probability.
• The solution space X. This is the set of all possible solutions. The
size of X is 2l, where l is the number of available countermeasures.
• Objective function fp(~S),
The objective function fp(~S) is used to evaluate solution ~S with respect
to the objective p. In this case, there are two objective functions, (6)
and (7).
• Neighbourhood Ns.
The TS moves at each iteration from current solution ~S to a neigh-
bouring one ~S′ based on a tabu selection process.
• Tabu List (tb).
The concept of the tabu list is introduced to prevent the problem of
possible cycling or/and infinite loop [26]. Tabu list does not allow
solutions that have been visited recently.
• Aspiration criteria.
The aspiration criteria is a global rule for allowing a move, even if it
is tabu, if it is a non-dominated solution [27].
• Stopping criteria. TS stops iterating when a given condition is reached.
The condition could be a given number of iterations, a running time
or a solution quality.
When applying MOTS to the minimisation problem proposed in this
study, MOTS moves in each iteration from the current solution ~S to a
neighbooring one ~S′. In our algorithm, neighbooring solutions are always
20
~S = ~Srnd; f
c
cur = fc(
~S); frcur = fr(
~S); /* random initial solution */
~Sbest = ~S; /* initialise best solution */
tb = ∅; /* initialise tabu list */
iter = 0 /* set an iteration counter */
while iter ≤ itermax do
iter = iter + 1
neigh = 0 /* initialise checked neighboor counter */
~Sbest
neigh
; fbest
neigh
/* best neighboor */
bestNeighList = ∅ /* Create best neighboor list */
while neigh ≤ Ns do
neigh = neigh+ 1
~S′ = randneigh(~S) /* neighboor selection */
fc
neigh
= fc(~S′); frneigh = fr(
~S′) /* evaluate its cost */
if dominated == 0 then
/* Is neighboor dominated by some solution in the pareto front?
*/
~Sbest = ~S
′; fc
best
= fc
neigh
; fr
best
= fr
neigh
/* save it */
StoreSolutionInPareto(~S′)
break; /* stop looking for neighboors */
end
if movement(~S, ~S′) in tb then
/* Is this movement forbidden? */
continue; /* Yes, skip it */
end
if neigh == 0, fc(~S′) < fc(~S) or fr(~S′) < fr(~S) then
StoreSolutionInBestNeighList(~S′)
end
neigh = neigh+ 1;
end
m = movement(~S, ~Sbest
neigh
)
~S = ~Sbest
neigh
; fccur = f
best,c
neigh
; frcur = f
best,r
neigh
/* Move to best neighboor */
tb = tb+ [m] /* add movement to tabu list */
removeOld(tabu) /* remove old entries */
end
Algorithm 1: Pseudo Code for multi-objective TS
21
selected randomly by choosing a random countermeasure Sl and changing
its allowance from 0 to 1 or vice versa.
First of all, in each iteration the neighboorhood Ns of a current solution
~S must be defined. In our case, we limit the number of visited neighboors to
a value Ns. Thus, MOTS moves from current solution ~S to its best neigh-
booring one (with the lowest cost and/or risk within the neighboorhood)
~S′ ∈ Ns. To construct the Pareto frontier, we remove dominated solutions.
The dominated solutions are those, which satisfy the following constraints:
• If the objective function value for cost fc(~S) is no greater than the
corresponding or is equal to cost function value of the neighboor, that
is: that is, fc(~S) ≤ fc(~S
′) and the objective function value for risk
fr(~S) is strictly less than the corresponding risk function value of the
neighboor: that is, fr(~S) < fr(~S
′);
• If the objective function value for cost fc(~S) is no greater than the
corresponding cost function value of the neighboor, that is: that is,
fc(~S) < fc(~S
′) and the objective function value for risk fr(~S) is no
greater or equal to the corresponding risk function value of the neigh-
boor: that is, fr(~S) ≤ fr(~S′);
• If the objective function value for cost fc(~S) is equal to the correspond-
ing cost function value of the neighboor, that is: that is, fc(~S) = fc(~S
′)
and the objective function value for risk fr(~S) is equal to the corre-
sponding risk function value of the neighboor: that is, fr(~S) = fr(~S
′);
It must be noted, that the objective function f(~S′) of the best neighbor
does not need to improve the current one f(~S). To avoid getting stuck in a
local minima, MOTS may move from current solution ~S to a neighbooring
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one ~S′ even it is worsening the objective function value [26]. The action of
this move from current solution ~S to its best neighboor ~S′ is called movement
[28]. MOTS stops iterating when a given condition is reached, i.e., given
number of iterations. The pseudo code of the MOTS is given in Algorithm
1.
4. Experiments and Discussion
In the following section, we demonstrate the validity of the proposed
model by applying an optimisation routine to help decision makers to decide
the best solution in multi-objective terms. We compare the qualities of
MOTS solutions to optimal ones obtained through the traditional exhaustive
search (ES) approah. We examine ten cases when the number of iterations
is changed from 500 iterations to 30 000 iterations to examine the speed of
the TS approach in finding near optimal solutions.
Prior to presenting actual results, it is appropriate to note that the
solving method was written in C++ and executed on an AMD Athlon II X2
245 2.8MHZ processor, 4GB RAM.
4.1. Testing the speed of MOTS
For the first experiment, we test the speed of the MOTS for the original
problem. Increasing the number of iterations, we have recorded the time.
Table 7 summarizes the efficiency of the MOTS recorded at each case.
The next step of the first experiment was to analyse the quality of solu-
tions obtained. Figure 3(a) shows the non-dominated solutions obtained in
500, 2500, 8000 and 20000 iterations.
In comparison, we took 8000 and 20 000 iteration generated solutions.
We did not observe any significant change in the non-dominated solutions
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Case Iterations Time (s)
1 500 5
2 1000 14
3 2500 44
4 5000 99
5 8000 163
6 10000 221
7 12000 261
8 15000 336
9 20000 450
10 30000 598
Table 7: TS time recorded for ten cases
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(a) Convergence of the Pareto Front
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Figure 3: Obtained Pareto front and difference in solutions
by varying the algorithm parameters. In 20000 iterations, MOTS has found
the same number of solutions with the difference in four of them. Two of
these solutions are labeled with the squared box in Figure 3(b). Once we
have noted that variation in solutions is not large and the speed difference
is significant for mentioned cases, we can assume, that stopping an algo-
rithm after 8000 iterations the decision maker could get the highest possible
number of optimal solutions.
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4.2. Testing the quality of solutions
The second experiment was to examine the quality of solutions obtained
by MOTS algorithm. We carried it out for the same data set using ex-
haustive search method (ES). An ES approach was chosen to this problem
for several reasons. First, ES is a search technique to solve multiobjective
optimisation problems based on enumerative evaluation of each possible so-
lution from a given finite set. Second and perhaps more important, the
ES approach is the only way at present to find an exact Pareto Front in
multi-objective problems [29].
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Figure 4: Comparison of the Pareto Front obtained by MOTS and ES algorithms
Figure 4(a) shows the Pareto front obtained by running ES. The algo-
rithm was able to obtain 106 solutions, which surely were optimal ones for
this problem. Analysing the quality of solutions, we have compared Pareto
fronts obtained by both algorithms, shown in Figure 4(b). We did not see
any change in solutions in the intervals of [1000:4500] by the objective 1
(cost) value and [1400:1700] by the objective 2 (risk). A decision maker, in
general, would be interested in these intervals, as they are the middle of the
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Pareto front with good trade-offs between both objectives.
Despite the fact, that ES is the only algorithm that has an ability to
obtain optimal solutions for multi-objective problems, the downside of ES
is that the search is computationally expensive.
TS ES
(8000 iterations)
Time (s) 163 2466
Number of non- 54 106
dominated solutions
Table 8: TS and ES comparison data
We have recorded the execution time required to generate the Pareto
Front for the ES approach and compared it with the TS 8000 iterations
approach (Table 8). MOTS search method has performed 15 times faster
than ES. Such a big time difference can be critical in a real life scenario if
the decision should be made instantly.
To justify the fact that MOTS has found near optimal solutions, we
have calculated Euclidean distance between solutions obtained by both al-
gorithms. Figure 5 shows how close these 54 solutions obtained by MOTS
were to the optimum one obtained by ES. It was recorded that 31 solution
obtained by MOTS was exactly the same as the ones obtained by ES, thus
we can say that MOTS has obtained 30% of optimal solutions when the
stopping condition was set to 8000 iterations (Table 9). Other solutions
though, are very close to optimum ones, as it can be seen in Figure 5.
4.3. Testing MOTS for the different problem
For the third experiment, we have modified the problem by varying the
likelihood Lij, impact Ii, cost Cl and matching zli values. In terms of speed,
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Figure 5: Euclidean distance between 54 MOTS obtained solutions and 106 ES optimum
ones
MOTS under different data set has performed very similarly to the original
problem. The time and quality of solutions are summarised in Table 9.
From the experiment, we can claim, that in the intervals of 5000 - 10000
iterations the decision maker can obtain higher percentage of optimal solu-
tions (∼ 30%). However, when time is considered as a stopping condition,
the best results would be achieved when the algorithm runs between 95s -
200 s.
With such results, MOTS approach shows acceptable levels of accuracy
in determining optimal solutions.
Once a decision maker has a better perspective of the solutions possi-
ble, the decision on what set of countermeasures should be selected can be
justified by the obtained cost and risk trade-offs. The MOTS algorithm has
proved to be an efficient way of solving security countermeasure problem
when there are two objectives to be minimised.
27
Iterations Original Problem (MOTS) Different Problem (MOTS)
Nr.of optimal Optimality in Time Nr.of optimal Optimality in Time
solutions % (s) solutions % (s)
500 0 0 5 0 0 3
2500 2 1.9 44 17 12 42
5000 11 10 99 25 19 94
8000 31 30 163 34 26 158
10 000 31 30 221 33 25 200
15 000 30 28 336 32 24 317
20 000 29 28 450 31 23 433
ES 106 100 2488 131 100 2842
Table 9: Result comparison under different data sets
5. Conclusion
The importance of decision making in the area of computer security
is well understood. Large body of work has been undertaken to support
decision makers by providing models which deal with the optimisation of
financial investments in relation to computer security. However, most of the
models described in existing study are hypothetical rather than practical.
This paper has proposed a novel risk assessment and optimisation model
(RAOM), which is partially based on NIST SP800-30 guidelines on per-
forming risk assessments in various organisations. We have adopted the
step-by-step procedure of assessing risk, however, we made some important
modifications in calculating impact of vulnerabilities and total risk. Due to
the fact, that computer security is referred to as CIA, we have designed a
way of defining risk in relation to an impact on CIA that each identified
vulnerability introduces.
The RAOM differs from previous attempts on improving computer se-
curity by applying optimisation techniques in several ways. First of all the
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RAOM seeks to assess risk considering an impact on CIA and likelihood that
possible threats will exploit identified vulnerabilities, whereas most recent
methodologies exclude this realistic fact and risk is assumed to be uniform
(e.g.[12]). Moreover, RAOM has an advantage that applying a Tabu Search
method to solve a multi-objective countermeasure selection problem formu-
lated in this study makes it possible to review the solutions with the good
balance between the two objectives: risk and cost.
Overall it can be concluded that RAOM contributes a new way to make
decisions more justified and informed. Experimental results showed that
MOTS approach is much faster than the ES approach in searching for the
Pareto optimal set. Moreover, the proposed MOTS algorithm showed a good
approximation of solutions if compared with the optimal solutions obtained
by the ES.
Despite the advantages RAOM and MOTS provides for decision makers,
larger size problems (e.g. when the size of security controls, threats and
vulnerabilities increases) have not been tested yet. A future research task
will thus be to test the performance and scalability of the proposed approach
and compare it with other heuristics. Furthermore, we would be interested
in adding constraints to the problem, such as a maximum budget assigned
for security countermeasure implementation and/or the bounds of risk an
organisation is willing to take.
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